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Controlling Agencies through
the President’s Budget Process
By Eloise Pasachoff*

I

PRESIDENT,FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET
t is obvious that the federal budget
is central to the functioning of the
11 (2015).
administrative state. But a critical
OIRA is often jokingly called the
element about the federal
most important government
budget is often missing from
office you’ve never heard of,
analyses of both the budget
because of its outsized but
and the administrative state
secretive role in overseeing
more generally:the way the
regulations. But the RMOs
President’s budget process—
surely vie for that title. Their
the year-round,continuous
pervasive role overseeing
process of developing the
agencies’ work on policy
new budget while executchoices and implementation
Eloise Pasachoff
ing the last one—provides
associated with the budget
a major source of control
and management is even
over agency policy choices,regardless
less well known than OIRA’s work
of whether or how much Congress
is. And in some sense,the RMOs
eventually appropriates at all. Scholoversee even more of the federal
ars,practitioners,and observers of
executive establishment than OIRA
the administrative state ought to
does. In part,this is because most
acknowledge this reality and consider
independent agencies run their
its implications.
budgets through OMB,whereas they
In the administrative law literature,
are not subject to OIRA’s regulatory
OMB is often referred to interreview process. But in large part,this
changeably with OIRA,the Office
is just because money really matters
of Information and Regulatory
for setting policy choices. As one
Affairs. The idea behind that
former political appointee in charge
interchangeability is that review of
of an RMO has explained,“You sit at
regulations is the key tool for centralthe pure epicenter of policy. You’re in
ized control of agency policymaking.
a position to make a difference. And
But OIRA is only one office within
eventually,everything will come
OMB,with only around 45 of the
across your desk.” Gordon Adams,
435 OMB employees. Almost half
The Office of Management and Budget:
of OMB’s employees work in the
The President’s Policy Tool,in THE
NATIONAL SECURITY ENTERPRISE :
“Resource Management Offices”
NAVIGATING THE LABYRINTH 58
(RMOs),five subject-matter-focused
(Roger Z. George & Harvey
offices on OMB’s “budget side” that
Rishikof eds.,2011).
collectively are more than four times
What are the ways in which the
as big as OIRA. See OFFICE OF MGMT.
& BUDGET,EXEC.OFFICE OF THE
RMOs exert their inf luence? For
each component of the executive
* Professor of Law,Georgetown University
budget process—the preparation of
Law Center. This essay is based on The
the President’s budget,the execution
President’s Budget as a Source of Agency
of the budget that Congress eventuPolicy Control, 125 YALE L. J. 2182
ally passes and the President signs,and
(2016) (co-winner of the Section’s 2017
the implementation of presidential
scholarship award).
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management initiatives that are
embedded in the budget—the RMOs
have a series of levers that function as
a form of policy control.
During budget preparation,when
agencies are working with OMB to
put together their budget requests
for Congress,three levers for control
exist. Through the form-and-content
lever,OMB sets ex ante requirements
for the budget and policy proposals
that agencies must submit for OMB’s
review. In other words,OMB tells
agencies what they should put in their
budget requests in the first place (the
content) and how they should convey
this information (the form).
A second lever during budget
preparation is the approval lever,under
which agencies must get OMB
approval for their budget requests.
Using this lever,OMB tells agencies
how their initial budget proposals
must be modified before they can
be transmitted to Congress. The
approval lever functions both at a
broad level,securing overall agency
compliance with the President’s
general policy preferences,and at a
narrow level,governing budget and
policy choices in discrete line items.
The third lever during budget
preparation is the confidentiality lever.
Under this lever,agency officials are
not allowed to talk about requests
that the agency made that OMB
denied. The confidentiality lever
limits agencies’ ability to state
publicly their own views of alternative budget and policy priorities.
OMB continues its inf luence over
agency action during budget execution. Under the specification lever,the
RMOs “apportion” and otherwise
define how agencies spend the funds
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Congress has appropriated. This is
a formal lever with tools set forth in
law, such as in the Anti-Deficiency
Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1512(a) (2012). The
other lever relevant to budget execution is more informal: the monitoring
lever, under which OMB, with individual RMO staff members assigned
to each agency, oversees the ongoing
work of that agency through regular
communication.
OMB also uses the executive
budget process to implement government-wide management initiatives,
which are often more substantive
than technical. President Bush’s faithbased initiative, for example, found
expression through the management
side of OMB. There are two levers
for control at work during management implementation. One is the
presidential management agenda lever,
where management initiatives either
explicitly contemplate substantive
policy choices or implicitly lead to
them. The other is the budget-nexus
lever, where the budget documents
themselves require implementation of
management initiatives.
Collectively, these seven levers
provide a great deal of control
over the administrative state. Is it
presidential control? It depends. On
the one hand, because of the RMOs’
direct line into agencies, this process
provides a ready way to communicate
presidential (and OMB director)
direction. On the other hand, because
of the deep programmatic knowledge
and frequent longevity of RMO staff,
conversations with expert RMO staff
can often affect what the President
and OMB director decide. In these
circumstances, the RMO views help
shape presidential control. Moreover,
many RMO decisions do not require
elevation to more senior political
appointees at all, and so from the
agency perspective, RMO direction
can often feel less like presidential
control and more like control by the
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efficiency. In addition, given the high
caliber of RMO staff members, decisions may often be better along some
metrics than had agencies chosen on
their own.
However, there is also cause for
concern about the way OMB exerts
its control through the executive
budget process. Three different
accountability issues arise. First,
there is a lack of transparency in the
way the RMOs’ work is conducted.
There is a great deal that we do not
know about the day-to-day process
of this work and about the substance
of policy ideas that OMB rejected.
OMB offers two rationales for
this lack of transparency, but both
responses are over-inclusive. OMB’s
claim for “policy consistency from
the executive branch,” OFFICE OF
MGMT.& BUDGET,EXEC.OFFICE OF

P RESIDENT,CIRCULAR NO.A-11,
P REPARATION,SUBMISSION,AND
EXECUTION OF THE BUDGET (2014),
§ 22.3, at 2, for example, should
not necessarily demand a fiction
that there was never any internal
disagreement. Relatedly, OMB’s
claim that confidentiality is needed
to protect the deliberative process,
id. at § 22.5, at 3, should not necessarily require secrecy about all of the
procedural steps—such as who met
with whom, when, and about what.
That kind of information could let
the public assess potential capture
problems. Greater transparency could
also deter one-sided dealing through
the budget process.
The second accountability problem
is that the RMOs’ work can elevate
OMB’s civil servants and lower-level
political appointees over Senateconfirmed agency officials, and the
ultimate lines of responsibility are
not well defined. The staff in the
RMOs can exert a lot of control
throughout the budget process, and
political actors in the agencies cannot
elevate everything to political officials at OMB and the White House
without losing credibility. But the
lack of transparency with which the
civil servants interact with agency
officials means that everyone can
avoid accountability when need be.
The RMOs’ work is so behind-thescenes that no one really talks about
it, much less calls them to account
for it. The confidentiality lever limits
agency officials from saying what
they want to say. And the President
can use this system to distance
himself from hard decisions.
The third accountability problem is
that the RMOs’ work on the budget
can seem very technocratic, and
that perception can obscure valuedriven or partisan decision making.
Values-based decision making is
perfectly valid for a budget; in fact,
one common definition of a budget
document is that it is a statement of
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RMO staff member with the agency
relationship.
What ought we to make of the
RMOs’ expansive work? There are
many good things about this process,
not the least of which is that it is
undoubtedly legal. This might sound
like faint praise, but given the perpetual questions about the legal basis for
OIRA’s decision-making authority, it
is no small matter. More substantively,
the RMOs provide a valuable service
in coordinating across the vast executive establishment, thereby promoting

“For each component of the
executive budget process …
the RMOs have a series
of levers that function as a
form of policy control.”
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values. But sometimes the budget can
be portrayed or perceived as a “just
the facts” document, obscuring the
fact that real choices based on values
are being made. Decisions that are
being made on the basis of values can
be masked with technocratic rhetoric.
All three of these issues make
it difficult for Congress and the
American public to hold anyone
accountable for these decisions—
agencies, OMB, and the White
House more generally. How, then, to
respond to these problems, keeping
what is good about the RMOs’ work
while at the same time increasing
accountability?
Some reforms are possible inside
the executive branch itself (for an
administration that wishes to make
them). For example, presidents could
issue executive orders governing the
RMOs’ process, like the executive
orders presidents routinely issue
governing OIRA’s process. Ideally
these executive orders would make
the process more transparent and in
so doing would create a degree of
ownership by the President of the
whole system. Both steps would
increase accountability. OMB itself
could do more to make its process
more transparent, in the same way

Ready to start
your career in
administrative
law?

that OIRA has implemented a regulatory dashboard to improve the public
information f low about the process of
regulatory review.
But presidential administrations
have incentives to maintain opacity,
so other reforms outside the executive
branch are important as well. For
its part, Congress should pay more
attention to the intra-executive budget
process and ask more questions about
it. Congress could, for example,
require the political appointees who
run each RMO but who are not
Senate confirmed to testify about their
budget and policy work. Congress
could also make these positions Senate
confirmed. There would be a lot of
drawbacks to doing so, but there could
also be some countervailing benefits
in terms of oversight. History suggests
that Congress could well take this
project on; when President Nixon
began to use OMB in politicized
ways, for example, Congress reacted in
part by making more OMB positions
Senate confirmed.
Civil-society organizations also
have an important role to play as
watchdogs of OMB. These organizations should start paying closer
attention to seemingly obscure budget
instructions coming from the OMB

director. They should try to get
Congress to conduct more oversight
of the budget process. And they
should include RMO staff in their
lobbying as they do Congress, agency
officials, and OIRA.
Understanding the work of the
RMOs also casts doubt on a reform
proposal critics have sometimes
offered about OIRA: that it has
become too powerful and ought to be
cut back, returning final rulemaking
authority to agencies. The RMOs’
existence demonstrates why such a
reform would not have the desired
outcome. OIRA’s process is vastly
more transparent than the similarly
expansive budget process. If OIRA’s
work were cut back, the budget
process could easily take it up, while
driving the reality of OMB’s control
further underground.
Paul O’Neill, a former deputy
director of OMB, once explained
that policy debates are “ref lected,
recorded, and battled over” in budget
numbers and that “the numbers are
the keys to the doors of everything.”
The administrative law community
ought to pay much more attention to
how these keys operate.
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